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ABSTRACT 
More than a quarter century after civil rights activists pioneered 
America’s first ridesharing network, the connections between 
transportation, innovation, and discrimination are again on full display. 
Industry leaders such as Uber, Amazon, and Waze have garnered 
widespread acclaim for successfully combatting stubbornly persistent 
barriers to transportation. But alongside this well-deserved praise has 
come a new set of concerns. Indeed, a growing number of studies have 
uncovered troubling racial disparities in wait times, ride cancellation 
rates, and service availability in companies including Uber, Lyft, Task 
Rabbit, Grubhub, and Amazon Delivery. 
 
Surveying the methodologies employed by these studies reveals a subtle, 
but vitally important, commonality. All of them measure discrimination 
at a statistical level, not an individual one. As a structural matter, this 
isn’t coincidental. As America transitions to an increasingly algorithmic 
society, all signs now suggest we are leaving traditional brick-and-
mortar establishments behind for a new breed of data-driven ones. 
Discrimination, in other words, is going digital. And when it does, it will 
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manifest itself—almost by definition—at a macroscopic scale. Why does 
this matter? Because not all of our civil rights laws cognize statistically-
based discrimination claims. And as it so happens, Title II could be 
among them. 
 
This piece discusses the implications of this doctrinal uncertainty in a 
world where statistically-based claims are likely to be pressed against 
data-driven establishments with increasing regularity. Its goals are 
twofold. First, it seeks to build upon adjacent scholarship by fleshing out 
the specific structural features of emerging business models that will 
make Title II’s cognizance of “disparate effect” claims so urgent. In 
doing so, it argues that it is not the “platform economy,” per se, that 
poses an existential threat to the statute but something deeper. The true 
threat, to borrow Lawrence Lessig’s framing, is architectural in nature. 
It is the algorithms underlying “platform economy businesses” that are 
of greatest doctrinal concern—regardless of whether such businesses 
operate inside the platform economy or outside it. Second, this essay 
joins others in calling for policy reforms focused on modernizing our civil 
rights canon. It argues that our transition from the “Internet Society” to 
the “Algorithmic Society” will demand that Title II receive a doctrinal 
update. If it is to remain relevant in the years and decades ahead, Title 
II must become Title 2.0. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For the rational study of the law the blackletter man may be the man of 
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics. 
—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 
 
The future is already here—it is just unevenly distributed. 
—William Gibson2 
 
It took just four days after Rosa Parks’ arrest to mount a response. Jo Ann 
Robinson, E.D. Nixon, Ralph Abernathy, and a little-known pastor named 
Martin King, Jr. would head a coalition of activists boycotting Montgomery, 
Alabama’s public buses.3 Leaders announced the plan the next day, 
expecting something like a 60% turnout.4 But to their surprise, more than 
90% of the city’s black ridership joined. The total exceeded 40,000 
individuals.5 
Sheer numbers—they quickly realized—meant that relying on taxis as 
their sole means of vehicular transport would be impossible. Instead, they 
got creative. The coalition organized an elaborate system of carpools and 
cabbies that managed to charge rates comparable to Montgomery’s own 
municipal system.6 And so it was that America’s first ridesharing network 
was born.7 
Fast forward some sixty years to the present and the connections between 
transportation, innovation, and civil rights are again on full display. 
Nowadays, the networking system pioneered by Montgomery’s protestors is 
among the hottest tickets in tech. Newly minted startups launching 
“ridesharing platforms,” “carsourcing software,” “delivery sharing 
networks,” “bikesharing” offerings, “carpooling apps,” and “scooter 
sharing” schemes are a seemingly daily fixture of the news. And just as was 
true during the Civil Rights Movement, discrimination continues to be a hot-
button issue. 
 
 1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 2. As quoted in Peering round the corner, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2001, 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2001/10/11/peering-round-the-corner. 
 3. JACK M. BLOOM, CLASS, RACE, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 140 (Ind. U. 
Press ed. 1987). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See History.com Editors, How the Montgomery Bus Boycott Accelerated the 
Civil Rights Movement, HISTORY CHANNEL (Feb. 3, 2010), https://www.history.com/ 
topics/black-history/montgomery-bus-boycott. 
 6. Id. 
 7. More precisely, the first large-scale ridesharing network making use of 
automobiles. 
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Industry leaders such as Uber, Amazon, and Waze have garnered 
widespread acclaim for successfully combatting discriminatory barriers to 
transportation that stubbornly persist in modern America.8 But alongside this 
well-deserved praise has come a new set of concerns. Indeed, a growing 
number of studies have uncovered troubling racial disparities in wait times, 
ride cancellation rates, and service availability in the likes of Uber, Lyft, 
Task Rabbit, Grubhub, and Amazon Delivery.9 The weight of the evidence 
suggests a cautionary tale: The same technologies capable of combatting 
modern discrimination also appear capable of producing it. 
Surveying the methodologies employed by these reports reveals a subtle, 
but vitally important, commonality. All of them measure discrimination at a 
statistical—not individual—scale.10 
As a structural matter, this isn’t coincidental. Uber, Amazon, and a host of 
other technology leaders have transformed traditional brick-and-mortar 
business models into data-driven ones fit for the digital age. Yet in doing so, 
they’ve also taken much discretion out of the hands of individual decision-
makers and put it into hands of algorithms.11 This transfer holds genuine 
promise of alleviating the kinds of overt prejudice familiar to Rosa Parks and 
her fellow activists. But is also means that when discrimination does occur, 
it will manifest—almost by definition—at a statistical scale. 
This piece discusses the implications of this fast-approaching reality for 
one of our most canonical civil rights statutes, Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.12 Today, a tentative consensus holds that certain of our civil rights 
laws recognize claims of “discriminatory effect” based in statistical 
evidence. But Title II is not among them.13 Indeed, more than a quarter 
century after its passage, it remains genuinely unclear whether the statute 
encompasses disparate effect claims at all. 
This essay explores the implications of this doctrinal uncertainty in a 
world where statistically-based claims are likely to be pressed against data-
driven companies with increasing regularity. Its goals are twofold. First, it 
seeks to build upon adjacent scholarship14 by fleshing out the specific 
structural features of emerging business models that will make Title II’s 
cognizance of disparate effect claims so urgent. In doing so, it argues that it 
 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See infra Part I(A). 
 10. See infra Part I(A). 
 11. See infra Part II(D). 
 12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2018). 
 13. See infra Part II(B). Major courts have recently taken up the issue tangentially, 
but uncertainty still reigns. 
 14. Of particular note is a groundbreaking piece by Nancy Leong and Aaron Belzer, 
The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 
GEO. L. J. 1271 (2017). 
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is not the “platform economy,” per se, that poses a threat to the civil rights 
law but something deeper. The true threat, to borrow Lawrence Lessig’s 
framing, is architectural in nature.15 It is the algorithms underlying emerging 
platform economy businesses that are of greatest doctrinal concern—
regardless of whether such businesses operate inside the platform economy 
or outside it.16 
Second, this essay joins other scholars in calling for policy reforms 
focused on modernizing our civil rights canon.17 It argues that our transition 
from the “Internet Society” to the “Algorithmic Society” will demand that 
Title II receive a doctrinal update.18 If the statute is to remain relevant in the 
years and decades ahead, Title II must become Title 2.0. 
I. THE RISE OF DATA-DRIVEN TRANSPORTATION 
Today, algorithms drive society. They power the apps we use to skirt 
traffic, the networking systems we use to dispatch mobility services, and 
even the on-demand delivery providers we use to avoid driving in the first 
place. 
For most Americans, paper atlases have been shrugged. Algorithms, of 
one variety or another, now govern how we move. And far from being 
anywhere near “peak”19 levels of digitization, society’s embrace of 
algorithms only appears to be gaining steam. With announcements of new 
autonomous and connected technologies now a daily fixture of the media, all 
signs suggest that we’re at the beginning of a long road to algorithmic 
ubiquity. Data-driven transportation might rightly be described as pervasive 
today. But tomorrow, it is poised to become the de facto means by which 
people, goods, and services get from Point A to B. 
Many have high hopes for this high-tech future, particularly when it comes 
to combatting longstanding issues of discrimination in transportation. 
Observers have hailed the likes of Uber and Lyft as finally allowing “African 
 
 15. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 509 (1999) (describing “architecture,” “norms,” “law,” and 
“markets” as the four primary modes of regulation). 
 16. And, needless to say, there will be a great many more companies that operate 
outside of it. 
 17. See, e.g., Leong & Belzer supra note 14; Andrew Selbst, Disparate Impact in 
Big Data Policing, 52 GEORGIA L. REV. 109 (2017) (discussing disparate impact liability 
in other civil rights contexts). 
 18. See Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1150 
(noting that society is entering a new post-internet phase he calls the “Algorithmic 
Society”). 
 19. Gil Press, A Very Short History of Digitization, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2015/12/27/a-very-short-history-of-digitization/ 
#1560b2bb49ac (describing digitization technologies in terms of “peak” adoption). 
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American customers [to] catch a drama-free lift from point A to point B.”20 
They’ve championed low-cost delivery services, such as Amazon and 
Grubhub, as providing viable alternatives to transit for individuals with 
disabilities.21 And they’ve even praised navigation apps, like Waze, for 
bursting drivers’ “very white, very male, very middle-to-upper class” 
bubbles.22 It is through algorithmic transportation, in other words, that we’re 
beginning to glimpse a more equitable America—with our mobility systems 
finally exorcised of the types of discrimination that stubbornly persist today, 
some fifty years after the passage of modern civil rights legislation. 
A. Out With the Old Bias, In With the New? 
As with seemingly all significant technological breakthroughs, however, 
algorithmic transportation also gives rise to new challenges. And 
discrimination is no exception. Already, multiple studies have revealed the 
potential for racial bias to infiltrate the likes of Uber, Lyft, Grubhub, and 
Amazon.23 The National Bureau of Economic Research’s (“NBER”) 
groundbreaking study revealing a pattern of racial discrimination in Uber 
and Lyft services is one such exemplar.24 After deploying test subjects on 
nearly 1,500 trips, researchers found that black riders25 experienced 
significantly higher wait times and trip cancellations than their white 
counterparts. 
The NBER’s piece was preceded—months earlier—by a similarly 
provocative report from Jennifer Stark and Nicholas Diakopoulus.26 Using a 
 
 20. E.g., Latoya Peterson, Uber’s Convenient Racial Politics, SPLINTER NEWS (Jul. 
23, 2015), https://splinternews.com/ubers-convenient-racial-politics-1793849400. 
 21. See, e.g., Winnie Sun, Why What Amazon Has Done For Medicaid And Low-
Income Americans Matters, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
winniesun/2018/03/07/why-what-amazon-has-done-for-medicaid-and-low-income-
americans-matters/#7dbe2ff1ac76; Paige Wyatt, Amazon Offers Discounted Prime 
Membership to Medicaid Recipients, THE MIGHTY (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://themighty.com/2018/03/amazon-prime-discount-medicaid/. 
 22. E.g., Mike Eynon, How Using Waze Unmasked My Privilege, MEDIUM (Oct. 2, 
2015), https://medium.com/diversify-tech/how-using-waze-unmasked-my-privilege-26 
355a84fe05. 
 23. See infra notes 14 – 28. See also, e.g., JACOB THEBAULT-SPIEKER ET AL., 
Towards a Geographic Understanding of the Sharing Economy: Systemic Biases in 
UberX and TaskRabbit, 21 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-HUMAN INTERACTION 
(2017). 
 24. YANBO GE, ET AL., RACIAL AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN TRANSPORTATION 
NETWORK COMPANIES, (2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22776. 
 25. Or riders with black-sounding names. 
 26. See Jennifer Stark & Nicholas Diakopoulus, Uber Seems to Offer Better Service 
in Areas With More White People. That Raises Some Tough Questions., WASH. POST 
(Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/10/uber-
seems-to-offer-better-service-in-areas-with-more-white-people-that-raises-some-tough-
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month’s worth of Uber API data, the scholars found a statistical correlation 
between passenger wait times and neighborhood demographic makeup. The 
upshot? That Uber’s patented “surge pricing algorithm” resulted in 
disproportionately longer wait times for people of color, even after 
controlling for factors such as income, poverty, and population density. 
Another example comes from Bloomberg, which reported in 2017 that 
Amazon’s expedited delivery services tended to bypass areas composed of 
predominantly black residents.27 Bloomberg’s findings were subsequently 
buttressed by a Washington Post piece revealing that the “delivery zones” of 
services such as Grubhub, Door Dash, Amazon Restaurants, and Caviar 
appeared highly limited in low-income, minority-majority areas.28 
B. Discrimination’s Digital Architecture 
While the patterns and practices uncovered by these reports vary 
dramatically, they share one commonality whose importance cannot be 
overstated. Each of them measures racial bias at a statistical—not 
individual—scale. 
As a structural matter, this observation is in some sense unavoidable. 
When discrimination occurs in traditional brick-and-mortar contexts, it 
generally does so out in the open. It is difficult to turn someone away from 
Starbucks,29 after all, without them being made aware of the denial, even if 
the precise rationale is not clear. 
But as the means by which Americans secure their transportation, food, 
and lodging goes increasingly digital, the “architecture”30 of discrimination 
will take on a different face. Our interactions with cab companies, public 
transportation providers, and delivery services will be mediated by 
algorithms that we neither see nor necessarily understand. And face-to-face 




 27. See David Ingold & Spencer Soper, Amazon Doesn’t Consider the Race of Its 
Customers. Should It?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/graph 
ics/2016-amazon-same-day/. 
 28. Tim Carman, D.C. has never had more food delivery options. Unless you live 




 29. This example is pulled from an all-too-recent headline. See Rachel Adams, 
Starbucks to Close 8,000 U.S. Stores for Racial-Bias Training After Arrests, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/business/starbucks-arrests-racial 
-bias.html. 
 30. See Lessig, supra note 15. 
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In countless respects, this transition is cause for celebration. A society 
driven by algorithms is one that holds genuine hope of eliminating the types 
of overt discrimination that drove civil rights reforms of past eras. But in its 
stead, an emerging body of evidence suggests that subtler forms of 
discrimination may persist—ones that could challenge the doctrinal 
foundations on which our civil rights laws currently rest. 
II. WHEN BLACKLETTER CIVIL RIGHTS LAW ISN’T BLACK AND 
WHITE 
When it comes to holding private entities that provide our transportation, 
food, and lodging accountable for racial discrimination, the usual suspect is 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act. Title II sets forth the basic guarantee that 
“[a]ll persons [are] entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place 
of public accommodation. . . without discrimination or segregation on the 
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”31 The statute defines 
“public accommodation” broadly as essentially any “establishment affecting 
interstate commerce.”32 
Pursuing a Title II claim requires, first, establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination. To do so, claimants must show they: (1) are members of a 
protected class; (2) were denied the full benefits of a public accommodation; 
and (3) were treated less favorably than others33 outside of the protected 
class.34 
A. The Intent Requirement and the Man of Statistics 
At first blush, establishing these prima facie elements using the types of 
evidence documented by the reports noted in Part I(A) may seem 
straightforward. But there’s just one tiny detail standing in the way. As it 
turns out, no one knows whether Title II actually prohibits the kinds of racial 
disparities uncovered by the studies. 
Not all civil rights laws, after all, allow claimants to use statistically-
disparate impacts as evidence of discrimination. Title VI, for example, does 
not, whereas Title VII does. 
 
 31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2018). 
 32. See id (with the exception of a few carve outs—private clubs being one such 
example). 
 33. Id (specifically, “. . . treated less favorably than others outside of the protected 
class” who are similarly situated). 
 34. Having established a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the 
defendant. For simplicity’s sake, this piece strictly analyzes prima facie claims and does 
not delve into the complexities of burden shifting and justifying legitimate business 
decisions under modern antidiscrimination law. 
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This distinction owes, in large part, to the antidiscrimination canon’s 
“intent requirement,” which draws a doctrinal dividing line between acts 
exhibiting “discriminatory intent” and those, instead, exhibiting 
“discriminatory effects.”35 To oversimplify, acts of intent can be understood 
as overt, “invidious acts of prejudiced decision-making.”36 Acts of effect, 
meanwhile, are those that “actually or predictably . . . result[] in a disparate 
impact on a [protected] group of persons” even when the explicit intent 
behind them is not discriminatory.37 
Ask Rosa Parks to give up her seat for a white passenger? The civil rights 
claim filed in response will likely take a narrow view of the interaction, 
examining the discrete intent behind it. Systematically route buses in such a 
way that they bypass Rosa Parks altogether? Under the right circumstances, 
this could be evidence of discrimination equally as troubling as in the former 
scenario. But the civil rights claim it gave rise to would likely entail a far 
wider view of the world—one that couched its arguments in statistics.38 
Today, a tentative consensus holds that theories involving discriminatory 
effects are available under the Fair Housing Act, the Age Discrimination and 
Employment Act, certain Titles of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. When it comes to Title II, however, the jury 
is still out. Neither the Supreme Court, a major circuit court, nor a federal 
administrative body has resolved the issue to date, and “there is a paucity of 
cases analyzing it.”39 
B. Hardie’s Open Question 
Uncertainties surrounding Title II’s scope most recently came to a head in 
Hardie v. NCAA. The case involved a challenge to the collegiate 
association’s policy of banning convicted felons from coaching certain 
tournaments. The plaintiff, Dominic Hardie, alleged that the policy 
disparately impacted blacks, putting the question of Title II’s 
“discriminatory effect” liability at center stage. 
The court of first impression ruled against Hardie, finding that Title II did 
 
 35. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(1) (2014)). 
 36. Susan Carle, A New Look at the History of Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 
63 FLO. L. REV. 251, 258 (2011). 
 37. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 
supra note 35. 
 38. Title VII offers plaintiffs a “disparate impact” framework under which they may 
prove unlawful discrimination alongside the more traditional “disparate treatment” 
model. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1994). 
 39. Hardie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 
2015), aff’d, 861 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2017), and superseded by, 876 F.3d 312 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
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not cognize such claims. But on appeal, the case’s focal point changed 
dramatically. In a surprise turn of events, the NCAA abandoned its structural 
argument against disparate impact liability outright. Instead, it conceded that 
Title II did, in fact, recognize statistical effects but asserted that the NCAA’s 
policy was, nonetheless, not a violation.40 
Thus, when the case came before the 9th Circuit, the question of whether 
Title II encompassed discriminatory effects was, essentially, rendered moot. 
The court ruled in favor of the NCAA’s narrower argument but went out of 
its way to emphasize that it had not decided the question of discriminatory 
effect liability. And no other major appeals court has addressed the issue 
since. 
C. Title II’s Fair Housing Act Moment 
It was not long ago that another civil rights centerpiece—the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968 (FHA)—found itself at a similar crossroads. The FHA makes it 
illegal to deny someone housing based on race. But a half century after the 
statute’s passage, the question of whether it prohibited disparate effects had 
not been tested in our highest court. 
By 2015, the Supreme Court had twice taken up the issue in two years.41 
And twice, the cases had settled in advance of a ruling. 
Then came Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The 
Inclusive Communities Project, alleging that a state agency’s allocation of 
tax credits disparately impacted the housing options of low-income families 
of color.42 This time, there was no settlement. And the ruling that followed 
was subsequently described as the “most important decision on fair housing 
in a generation.”43 
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy affirmed that the FHA 
extended to claims of both discriminatory intent and effect.44 Kennedy was 
careful to note that the FHA’s passage occurred at a time when explicitly 
 
 40. See id. (“On appeal, the NCAA does not challenge Hardie’s argument that Title 
II encompasses disparate-impact claims. . . . Instead, the NCAA asks us to affirm entry 
of summary judgment in its favor on either of two other grounds advanced below, 
assuming arguendo that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under Title II.”). 
 41. See Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, (8th Cir. 2010), cert. dismissed, 565 U.S. 
1187, 132 S.Ct. 1306 (2012); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. 
Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3rd Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 571 U.S. 1020, 134 S.Ct. 636 
(2013). 
 42. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2514 (2015) [hereinafter “Inclusive Communities”]. 
 43. Kristen Capps, With Justice Kennedy’s Retirement, Fair Housing Is in Peril, 
CITYLAB (Jun. 28, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/06/what-justice-
kennedys-retirement-means-for-fair-housing/563924/. 
 44. But his ruling, according to some commenters, took a troublingly narrow view 
of viable disparate impact claims. 
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racist policies—such as zoning laws, racial covenants, and redlining—were 
the norm. But the Justice, nonetheless, stressed that more modern claims 
alleging racially disparate impacts were also “consistent with the FHA’s 
central purpose.”45 
D. The New Back of the Bus 
Much like the FHA, Title II arrived on the scene when discriminatory 
effect claims were far from the leading concern among civil rights activists. 
As Richard Epstein writes: 
 
Title II was passed when memories were still fresh of the many 
indignities that had been inflicted on African American citizens 
on a routine basis. It took little imagination to understand that 
something was deeply wrong with a nation in which it was 
difficult, if not impossible, for African American citizens to 
secure food, transportation, and lodging when traveling from 
place to place in large sections of the country. In some instances, 
no such facilities were available, and in other cases they were 
only available on limited and unequal terms.46 
 
The paradigmatic act of discrimination, in other words, was intentional, 
overt, and explicitly racial. 
Today, however, we are heading toward a world in which this paradigm is 
apt to turn on its head. Gone will be the days of racially explicit denials of 
service such as the well-documented phenomena of “hailing a cab while 
black,” “dining while black,” “driving while black,” or “shopping while 
black.”47 But as an increasing body of evidence suggests, inequality will not 
simply disappear as a consequence. Rather, discrimination will go digital. 
And when it does occur, it will likely manifest not as a discrete act of 
individual intent but instead as a statistically disparate effect. 
With this future in view, forecasting the consequences for Title II requires 
little speculation. Absent the ability to bring statistically-based claims 
against tomorrow’s data-driven establishments, Title II could be rendered 
irrelevant.48 
 
 45. See Inclusive Communities supra note 42. 
 46. Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 
(2014). 
 47. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Uber and Taxi Racism, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/11/28/uber_makes_cabbing_while_black_
easier.html; DANIELLE DIRKS & STEPHEN K. RICE in RACE AND ETHNICITY: ACROSS 
TIME, SPACE, AND DISCIPLINE 259 (Rodney Coates ed., 2004). 
 48. In effect, this means that the greatest threat to the statute may not be the doctrinal 
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If America is to deliver on its guarantee of equal access to public 
accommodations, its civil rights laws must reach the data-driven delivery 
services, transportation providers, and logistics operators that increasingly 
move our society.49 Failing to do so simply because these business models 
were not the norm at the time of the statute’s passage could lead to tragic 
results. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote more than a century ago: 
 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting 
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long 
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the 
past.50 
 
To save one of our antidiscrimination canon’s most iconic statutes from 
such a fate, all signs now suggest it will need a doctrinal update. Title II, in 
software parlance, must become Title 2.0. 
III. A POLICY ROADMAP FOR TITLE 2.0 
With the foregoing analysis in our rearview mirror, it is now possible to 
explore the road ahead. The policy challenges of applying Title II to a data-
driven society appear to be at least threefold. Policymakers should establish: 
(1) whether Title II cognizes statistically-based claims; (2) what modern 
entities are covered by Title II; and (3) what oversight mechanisms are 
necessary to detect discrimination by such entities? The following sections 
discuss these three challenges, as well as the steps policymakers can take to 
address them through judicial, legislative, or regulatory reform. 
A. Statistically-based Claims in a Data-Driven Society 
The first, and most obvious, policy reform entails simply clarifying Title 
II’s cognizance of statistically based claims. Such clarification could come 
at the judicial or regulatory level, as occurred with the FHA. Or it could come 
at the legislative level, as occurred with Title VII. 
Though the question of whether litigants can sustain statistical claims 
under Title II may seem like an all-or-nothing proposition, recent experience 
shows this isn’t actually true. Short of directly translating Title VII theories 
to Title II, there exist numerous alternatives. Justice Kennedy himself noted 
 
uncertainty posed by “platform economy businesses,” per se. Instead, it could be the 
algorithmic “architecture” that drives such companies, regardless of whether they adopt 
a “platform” business model. 
 49. No matter one’s ideological view, the dismantling of legislation through mere 
technological obsolescence would be a troubling outcome. 
 50. See Holmes supra note 1 at 469. 
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as much in Inclusive Communities when he remarked that “the Title VII 
framework may not transfer exactly to [all other] context[s].”51 
Nancy Leong and Aaron Belzer convincingly argue that one framing 
might involve adopting a modern take on discriminatory intent claims. The 
scholars assert that even if intent is deemed essential under Title II, 
statistically based claims could nevertheless satisfy the requirement.52 In 
their telling, the intent requirement could manifest through a company’s 
“decision to continue using a platform design or rating system despite having 
compelling evidence that the system results in racially disparate treatment of 
customers.”53 Under this view, the claim would then be distinguishable from 
unintentional claims because “once the aggregated data is known to reflect 
bias and result in discrimination,” its continued use would constitute 
evidence of intent.54 
Not only would this approach countenance Kennedy’s admonition in 
Inclusive Communities “that disparate-impact liability [be] properly 
limited,”55 it may also offer an elegant means of addressing the concerns 
raised by dissenting opinions that Title II claims demonstrate a defendant’s 
discriminatory “intent.”56 Policymakers should, therefore, take this line of 
analysis into consideration when clarifying Title II’s scope. 
B. Public Accommodations in a Data-Driven Society 
Although this essay has thus far presumed that large-scale algorithmic 
transportation services like Uber and Amazon are covered by Title II, even 
that conclusion remains unclear. As enacted, Title II is actually silent as to 
whether it covers conventional cabs, much less emerging algorithmic 
transportation models.57 A second policy reform, therefore, would entail 
clarifying whether Title II actually covers such entities in the first place. 
Here, understanding the origins of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is again 
useful. The statute lists several examples of public accommodations that 
 
 51. See Inclusive Communities, supra note 42. 
 52. See Leong & Belzer supra note 14, at 1313. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. Indeed, this argument may become especially compelling in a world 
where improved digital analytics enable much more customized targeting of individuals 
or traits. With more fine-grained control over data-driven algorithms, it may become 
much more difficult to justify the use of those that appear to perpetuate bias against 
protected groups. 
 55. See Inclusive Communities, supra note 42. 
 56. See, e.g. id. (Justice Alito’s dissent highlighted Title II’s “because of” language). 
 57. See, e.g., Bryan Casey, Uber’s Dilemma: How the ADA Could End the On 
Demand Economy, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 124, 134 (citing Ramos v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
No. SA-14-CA-502-XR, 2015 WL 758087, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015)). 
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were typical of America circa 1960.58 Some courts have suggested that this 
list is more or less exhaustive.59 But that view is inconsistent with the law’s 
own language.60 And numerous others have taken a broader view of the term 
“public accommodations,” which extends to entities that were not 
necessarily foreseen by the statute’s original drafters.61 
Policymakers in search of analogous interpretations of public 
accommodations laws need look no further than the Americans With 
Disabilities Act (ADA). Like Title II, the ADA covers places of public 
accommodation. And, again like Title II, its drafters listed specific entities 
as examples—all of which were the types of brick-and-mortar 
establishments characteristic of the time. But in the decades since its passage, 
the ADA’s definition has managed to keep pace with our increasingly digital 
world. Multiple courts have extended the statute’s reach to distinctly digital 
establishments, including popular websites and video streaming providers.62 
Policymakers should note, however, that Uber and Lyft have fiercely 
resisted categorization as public accommodations.63 In response to numerous 
suits filed against them, the companies have insisted they are merely 
“platforms” or “marketplaces” connecting sellers and buyers of particular 
services.64 As recently as 2015, this defense was at least plausible. And 
numerous scholars have discussed the doctrinal challenges of applying 
antidiscrimination laws to these types of businesses.65 But increasingly, 
companies like Uber, Lyft, and Amazon are shifting away from passive 
 
 58. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2018). 
 59. See Leong & Belzer supra note 14, at 1296. 
 60. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2018) (prohibiting 
discrimination in “establishment[s] affecting interstate commerce”). 
 61. See, e.g., Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(“Title II of the Civil Rights Act is to be liberally construed and broadly read.”). 
 62. See Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netfix, Inc., 869 F Supp. 2d 196, 200-02 (D. Mass. 
2012) (holding the video streaming service constitutes a “public accommodation” even 
if it lacks a physical nexus); National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 
3d 565, 576 (D. Vt. 2015) (holding that an online repository constitute a “public 
accommodation” for the purpose of the ADA). But see Tara E. Thompson, Comment, 
Locating Discrimination: Interactive Web Sites as Public Accommodations Under Title 
II of the Civil Rights Act, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409, 412 (“The courts, however, have 
not reached a consensus as to under what circumstances ‘non-physical’ establishments 
can be Title II public accommodations.”); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F Supp. 
2d 532, 543-44 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that online chatroom was not a “public 
accommodation” under Title II). 
 63. See Casey, supra note 57. The Department of Justice and numerous courts have 
expressed skepticism of this view. But, to date, there has been no definitive answer to 
this question—due in part to the tendency of lawsuits against Uber and Lyft to settle in 
advance of formal rulings. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See generally id.; Leong & Belzer supra note 14. 
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“platform” or “marketplace” models into more active service provider 
roles.66 All three, for example, now deploy transportation services directly. 
And a slew of similarly situated companies appear poised to replicate this 
model.67 For most such companies, passive descriptors like “platform” or 
“marketplace” are no longer applicable. Our laws should categorize them 
accordingly. 
C. Oversight in a Data-Driven Society 
Finally, regulators should consider implementing oversight mechanisms 
that allow third parties to engage with the data necessary to measure and 
detect discrimination. In an era of big data and even bigger trade secrets, this 
is of paramount importance. Because companies retain almost exclusive 
control over their proprietary software and its resultant data, barriers to 
accessing the information necessary even to detect algorithmic impacts often 
can be insurmountable. And the ensuing asymmetries can render 
discrimination or bias effectively invisible to outsiders. 
Another benefit of oversight mechanisms is their ability to promote good 
corporate governance without the overhead of more intrusive command-and-
control regulations. Alongside transparency, after all, comes the potential for 
extralegal forces such as ethical consumerism, corporate social 
responsibility, perception bias, and reputational costs to play meaningful 
roles in checking potentially negative behaviors.68 By pricing externalities 
through the threat of public or regulatory backlash, these and other market 
forces can help to regulate sectors undergoing periods of rapid disruption 
with less risk of chilling innovation than traditional regulation.69 
 
 66. See Bryan Casey, A Loophole Large Enough to Drive an Autonomous Vehicle 
Through: The ADA’s “New Van” Provision and the Future of Access to Transportation, 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (Dec. 2016), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/loophole 
-large-enough/ (describing Uber’s and Lyft’s efforts to deploy autonomous taxi fleets). 
Other platform companies in different sectors are acting similarly. See, e.g., Katie Burke, 
Airbnb Proposes New Perk For Hosts: A Stake in The Company, SAN FRANCISCO BUS. 
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/09/21/air 
bnb-hosts-ipo-sec-equity.html. 
 67. See Casey, supra note 66 (noting the ambitions of Tesla, Google, and a host of 
others to deploy similar autonomous taxi models). 
 68. See Bryan Casey, Amoral Machines; Or, How Roboticists Can Learn to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Law, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE at 1358. There was, for 
example, a happy ending to the recent revelations regarding racial disparities in Amazon 
delivery services. See Spencer Soper, Amazon to Fill All Racial Gaps in Same-Day 
Delivery Service, BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/article 
s/2016-05-06/amazon-to-fill-racial-gaps-in-same-day-delivery-after-complaints. 
 69. As importantly, this encourages proactive antidiscrimination efforts as opposed 
to retroactive ones. See Mark Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, U. CHI. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019). Without meaningful oversight, the primary risk is not that 
industry will intentionally build discriminatory systems but that “[biased] effects [will] 
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Some scholars have proposed federal reforms—akin to those put forward 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,70 the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development,71 and the Department of Education72—as 
a means of implementing oversight mechanisms for Title II.73 But state-level 
action, in this instance, may be more effective. A multi-fronted push that is 
national in scope provides a higher likelihood of successful reform. And 
much like the “Brussels Effect” documented at an international level, intra-
territorial policies imposed on inter-territorial entities can have extra-
territorial effects within the U.S.74 As the saying goes: “As goes California, 
so goes the nation.”75 
As a parting note, it cannot be stressed enough that mere “disclosure” 
mechanisms are not necessarily enough.76 For oversight to be meaningful, it 
must be actionable—or, in Deirdre Mulligan’s phrasing, “contestable.”77 
That is, it must allow downstream users to “contest[] what the ideal really 
is.”78 Moreover, if oversight is to be accomplished through specific 
administrative bodies, policymakers must ensure that those bodies have the 
technical knowhow and financial resources available to promote public 
accountability, transparency, and stakeholder participation. Numerous 
scholars have explored these concerns at length, and regulators would do 
well to consider their insights.79 
 
simply happen, without public understanding or deliberation, led by technology 
companies and governments that are yet to understand the broader implications of their 
technologies once they are released into complex social systems.” See ALEX CAMPOLO 
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CONCLUSION 
Following any major technological disruption, scholars, industry leaders, 
and policymakers must consider the challenges it poses to our existing 
systems of governance. Will the technology meld? Must our policies 
change? 
Algorithmic transportation is no exception. This piece examines its 
implications for one of America’s most iconic statutes: Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. As algorithms expand into a vast array of 
transportation contexts, they will increasingly test the doctrinal 
foundations of this canonical law. And without meaningful intervention, 
Title II could soon find itself at risk of irrelevance. 
But unlike policy responses to technological breakthroughs of the past, 
those we have seen so far offer genuine hope of timely reform. As Ryan Calo 
notes, unlike a host of other transformative technologies that escaped 
policymakers’ attention until too late, this new breed “has managed to 
capture [their] attention early [] in its life-cycle.”80 
Can this attention be channeled in directions that ensure that our most 
important civil rights laws keep pace with innovation? That question, it now 
appears, should be on the forefront of our policy agenda. 
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